# Potential pandemic bird flu modified to be more dangerous in new risky NIH research

By **Dilyana Gaytandzhieva** - January 24, 2022



Dr. Anthony Fauci, director of the US National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID), putting his protective suit. Photo:

The US National Institutes of Health (NIH) has continued funding risky gain-of-function research (GoF) on potential pandemic pathogens, newly disclosed information reveals. The US government medical research agency has funded scientists to study avian influenza (bird flu) which does not transmit among humans. However, the NIH projects aim to make avian influenza viruses able to transmit among mammals and assess their pandemic potential as a possible threat to humans.

Gain-of-function (GOF) studies improve the ability of a pathogen to cause disease by increasing its virulence and transmissibility. These dangerous experiments have not been terminated even though COVID-19 has been suspected to be the result of such NIH-funded GoF research in the Wuhan Institute of Virology.

Instead of terminating all GoF research since the pandemic started NIH and its sub agency – the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID), have continued their financial support for the following GoF studies: Transmissibility of Avian Influenza Viruses in Mammals (NIAID support ended in **August 2021**); Centers of Excellence for Influenza Research and Surveillance (CEIRS) (NIAID support ended in **March 2021**). The third one: Mimicking evolution to define mechanisms of airborne transmission of H7N9 viruses, started on 2<sup>nd</sup> September 2021 and is **ongoing**.

### Transmissibility of avian influenza viruses in mammals

4R01AI069274-09

Former Number 5R01AI069274-09 Contact PI/Project Leader KAWAOKA, YOSHIHIRO

Awardee Organization UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN-MADISON



## Description

#### **Abstract Text**

DESCRIPTION (provided by applicant): Since 1997, highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses of the H5N1 subtype have infected humans with high case fatality rates, although no sustained human-to-human transmission has yet been reported. Currently, the molecular features and mechanisms that would result in human-to-human transmission of H5N1 viruses are not fully understood. Indeed, several attempts in the past to select transmissible H5 viruses (which typically do not transmit among mammals) were not successful, suggesting that influenza virus transmissibility is determined by several currently unknown factors. Recently, we screened H5 virus libraries possessing random mutations in the globular head region of the hemagglutinin (HA) protein and identified mutant H5 HAs that acquired the ability to bind to human-type receptors. These mutant H5 HAs did not support virus transmission among ferrets (an established influenza virus transmission model) via respiratory droplets, but acquired this ability after two passages of the virus in these animals, which resulted in the selection of additional mutations in HA. This marks the first conversion of an H5 virus that does not transmit among ferrets into one with efficient respiratory droplet transmission. Based on this finding, we propose to decipher the determinants of H5N1 virus transmission in mammals. In Aim 1, we plan "To Identify the Mechanisms That Control H5N1 Virus Transmissibility in Mammals". To gain a better understanding of the mutations in HA that result in transmissible viruses, we will select transmissible viruses based on H5 HA proteins derived from different subclades that have caused human infections. Our recent study suggested that HA stability may contribute to virus transmissibility. To test this concept, we also plan to identify mutations in HA that increase HA stability and then test these mutations for their significance in virus transmissibility. The HA proteins of all ferret-transmissible H5N1 viruses will then be characterized for their receptor-binding specificity, their structural consequences, their effects in other genetic backgrounds, and their pathogenicity in mice and ferrets. Mutations in HA that allow avian influenza viruses to bind to human-type receptors are most likely a prerequisite for transmission among mammals; however, findings by us and others indicate that humantype receptor binding is not sufficient for respiratory droplet transmission among ferrets, and that other viral genes also contribute to transmissibility. In Aim 2 ("To Characterize the Contribution of Viral Genes Other than HA to H5N1 Virus Transmissibility", we plan to passage non-transmissible viruses of different genetic backgrounds in ferrets to select transmissible mutants. Selected mutations will be characterized for their biological effects, using established assays for internalization, intracellular transport replication and transcription, assembly and budding, and interferon antagonism. Collectively, these studies are expected to generate critical information about the molecular determinants and mechanisms of H5N1 virus transmissibility in mammals.

Project 4R01AI069274-09 - Total funding: \$605,206

H5N1, a highly pathogenic avian influenza virus, does not transmit among mammals. The researchers aim to make the virus able to transmit in order to assess its pandemic potential.

According to the project's description, "no sustained human-to-human transmission has yet been reported. Several attempts in the past to select transmissible H5 viruses (which typically do not transmit among mammals) were not successful". That is why the researchers "plan to passage nontransmissible viruses of different genetic backgrounds in ferrets (an established influenza virus transmission model) to select transmissible mutants". Selected mutations will be characterized for their biological effects and the potential of H5N1 to transmit in mammals.

## CENTERS OF EXCELLENCE FOR INFLUENZA RESEARCH AND SURVEILLANCE (CEIRS)

Project Number 272201400008C-0-0-1 Contact PI/Project Leader GARCIA-SASTRE, ADOLFO

**Awardee Organization** ICAHN SCHOOL OF MEDICINE AT MOUNT SINAL



# Description

## **Abstract Text**

To determine the molecular, ecologic and/or environmental factors that influence the evolution, emergence, transmission and pathogenicity of influenza viruses, including studies on animal influenza viruses with pandemic potential and to characterize the immune response to influenza infection to improve understanding of the immune correlates of protection and cross-protection

## Public Health Relevance Statement

Data not available

Project 272201400008C-0-0-1 - Total funding: \$7,336,466

The project includes studies on animal influenza viruses with pandemic potential. No further information has been provided.

### Mimicking evolution to define mechanisms of airborne transmission of H7N9 viruses

1R21AI144135-01

Contact PI/Project Leader SUTTON, TROY CLAVELL

PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY-UNIV PARK



## Description

#### **Abstract Text**

The Asian lineage H7N9 avian influenza viruses (AIV) have caused >1500 human zoonotic infections with 615 deaths. These viruses have not pread in humans; however, there is a high potential for these viruses to evolve to transmit via the airborne route and cause a pandemic. Using ferrets, we previously evaluated the ability of the prototypic Asian lineage virus, A/Anhui/1/2013 (H7N9), to undergo two continuous rounds of airborne transmission. In these studies, we found that the virus was able to transmit to 50-66% of respiratory contact ferrets during both rounds of transmission. In a subsequent deep sequence analysis, we identified 2-5 mutations in 90-99% of all variant viruses that transmitted. These mutations were in the hemagglutinin (HA), neuraminidase (NA), and viral polymerase genes. As airborne transmission is associated with enhanced binding and replication in cells of the upper airways, we hypothesize that the identified mutations will alter the molecular properties of the virus to enhance replication in primary human nasal and tracheal epithelial cells. Our aims are: Aim 1. Determine the role of previously identified HA and NA mutations in an H7N9 virus with the A/PR/8 vaccine backbone. Viruses carrying the H7N9 HA and NA on the A/PR8 vaccine backbone will generated. Mutations will be introduced into the HA and NA gene segments and several properties including recepto binding preference, pH of fusion, thermostability, NA activity, and changes in antibody recognition via immune serum will be evaluated. Aim 2. Evaluate the role of previously identified mutations on the viral polymerase. To assess the impact of mutations in the viral polymerase, in vitro polymerase reconstitution assays will be performed. Specifically, the activity of the wild-type H7N9 polymerase with and without the identified mutations will be assessed. Aim 3. Determine if the introduction of previously identified mutations alters viral replication in primary human airway epithelial cells. To determine if the identified mutations impact viral replication, we will evaluate the replication kinetics of recombinant  $H7N9-A/PR8\ viruses\ for\ their\ growth\ in\ primary\ human\ airway\ epithelial\ cells.\ Primary\ human\ cells\ will\ include\ nasal,\ tracheal,\ bronchial,\ and\ primary\ human\ cells\ will\ include\ nasal,\ tracheal,\ bronchial,\ and\ primary\ human\ cells\ will\ include\ nasal,\ tracheal,\ bronchial,\ and\ primary\ human\ cells\ will\ include\ nasal,\ tracheal,\ bronchial,\ and\ primary\ human\ cells\ will\ nasal,\ nasal,\$ small airway epithelial cells. Collectively, these studies will determine the effect of the identified mutations on different molecular properties of the virus, while also determining if the mutations alter the viral tropism in human cells. Our findings will generate new insight on how AIV evolve to transmit via the airborne route and will yield critical knowledge required to interpret the evolution and assess the pandemic potential of H7N9

Project 1R21AI144135-01 - Total funding: \$226,169

### Source: NIAID

According to the description provided for Project 1R21AI144135-01: "The Asian lineage H7N9 avian influenza viruses (AIV)... have not spread in humans; however, there is a high potential for these viruses to evolve to transmit via the airborne route and cause a pandemic... Viruses carrying the H7N9 HA and NA on the A/PR8 vaccine backbone will be generated. Mutations will be introduced into the HA and NA gene segments...we will evaluate the replication kinetics of recombinant H7N9-A/PR8 viruses for their growth in primary human airway epithelial cells. Primary human cells will include nasal, tracheal, bronchial, and small airway epithelial cells." The researchers want to make the virus able to transmit via the airborne route in order to assess the pandemic potential of H7N9 viruses.

These last NIH-funded experiments are just a small part of many controversial lab studies approved by the agency. One of them was the risky bat coronavirus research in China which is under investigation in the US for a possible link to the COVID-19 pandemic.

Despite repeated denials from NIAID director Dr. Antony Fauci including before Congress, NIH finally acknowledged last year that US did fund GoF research on bat coronaviruses in Wuhan from where the pandemic started and spread across the world. The \$3.7 million grant was awarded to the US non-profit organization EcoHealth Alliance. In a letter to U.S. House of Representatives NIH states that EcoHealth Alliance violated Terms and Conditions of NIH grant AI110964 and failed to report all its activities in China. According to the NIH letter, a "limited experiment" was conducted in order to test if "spike proteins from naturally occurring bat coronaviruses circulating in China were capable of binding to the human ACE2 receptor in a mouse model."

## This is much bigger than Dr. Fauci - it involves the entire US government: US Congressman

Following the release of a House Intelligence Committee report stating that "significant circumstantial evidence" supports the lab leak hypothesis, Rep. Mike Gallagher urged members of Congress and members of the media to more closely scrutinize additional US funding streams that sent taxpayer dollars to EcoHealth Alliance. According to the congressman, "If you start to do basic research, it quickly becomes apparent that this is much bigger than Dr. Fauci – it involves the entire US government".

EcoHealth Alliance has received **\$112.1 million** in total in US government funding since 2003, according to information obtained from the US federal contracts registry. Among its main sponsors are NIH through NIAID and the Pentagon through the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA). The projects' objectives are discovery and assessment of viruses with pandemic potential mainly in Africa and Asia.

## NIH grants:

| UNDERSTANDING THE RISK OF BAT CORONAVIRUS EMERGENCE  COMPARATIVE SPILLOVER DYNAMICS OF AVIAN INFLUENZA IN ENDEMIC COUNTRIES  COMPARATIVE SPILLOVER DYNAMICS OF AVIAN INFLUENZA IN ENDEMIC COUNTRIES  COMPARATIVE SPILLOVER DYNAMICS OF HENIPAVIRUSES IN SOUTH ASIA  COMPARATIVE OUTBREAKS OF HENIPAVIRUSES IN SOUTH ASIA  COMPARATOR OF TUTURE OUTBREAKS OF HENIPAVIRUSES IN SOUTH ASIA   | Name              | Awardee                   | <b>Dollars Obligated</b> | Award Date     | Updated At |
|---|-------------------|---------------------------|--------------------------|----------------|------------|
| U01Al153420 Ecohealth Alliance Inc.  STUDY OF NIPAH VIRUS DYNAMICS AND GENETICS IN ITS BAT RESERVOIR AND OF HUMAN EXPOSURE TO NIV ACROSS BANGLADESH TO UNDERSTAND PATTERNS OF HUMAN OUTBREAKS  \$3.1m 6/17/2020 6/11/202  U01Al151797 Ecohealth Alliance Inc.  UNDERSTANDING RISK OF ZOONOTIC VIRUS EMERGENCE IN EID HOTSPOTS OF SOUTHEAST ASIA  R01Al110964 Ecohealth Alliance Inc.  UNDERSTANDING THE RISK OF BAT CORONAVIRUS EMERGENCE  UNDERSTANDING THE RISK OF BAT CORONAVIRUS EMERGENCE  R56TW009502 Ecohealth Alliance Inc.  COMPARATIVE SPILLOVER DYNAMICS OF AVIAN INFLUENZA IN ENDEMIC COUNTRIES  R01Al079231 Ecohealth Alliance Inc.  RISK OF VIRAL EMERGENCE FROM BATS  \$442.8k 9/15/2007 9/14/2012  \$442.8k 9/15/2007 9/14/2012  RISK FOR FUTURE OUTBREAKS OF HENIPAVIRUSES IN SOUTH ASIA |                   | 0                         |                          |                |            |
| EXPOSURE TO NIV ACROSS BANGLADESH TO UNDERSTAND PATTERNS OF HUMAN OUTBREAKS   | U01AI153420       | Ecohealth Alliance Inc.   | \$1.2m                   | 9/15/2020      | 7/1/2021   |
| UNDERSTANDING RISK OF ZOONOTIC VIRUS EMERGENCE IN EID HOTSPOTS OF SOUTHEAST ASIA  RO1Al110964   |                   |                           |                          |                |            |
| UNDERSTANDING RISK OF ZOONOTIC VIRUS EMERGENCE IN EID HOTSPOTS OF SOUTHEAST ASIA  RO1Al110964   | ۵                 | 0                         |                          |                |            |
| R01Al110964 Ecohealth Alliance Inc.  UNDERSTANDING THE RISK OF BAT CORONAVIRUS EMERGENCE  R56TW009502 Ecohealth Alliance Inc.  COMPARATIVE SPILLOVER DYNAMICS OF AVIAN INFLUENZA IN ENDEMIC COUNTRIES  R01Al079231 Ecohealth Alliance Inc.  RISK OF VIRAL EMERGENCE FROM BATS  R01Al079231 Ecohealth Alliance Inc.  RISK OF VIRAL EMERGENCE FROM BATS  R01Al079231 Ecohealth Alliance Inc.  RISK OF VIRAL EMERGENCE FROM BATS  R1SK FOR FUTURE OUTBREAKS OF HENIPAVIRUSES IN SOUTH ASIA  \$3.7m 8/1/2002 7/27/201.  | U01AI151797       | Ecohealth Alliance Inc.   | \$3.1m                   | 6/17/2020      | 6/11/2021  |
| RO1Al110964 Ecohealth Alliance Inc.  UNDERSTANDING THE RISK OF BAT CORONAVIRUS EMERGENCE  \$300.0k 9/17/2012 9/14/2012  R56TW009502 Ecohealth Alliance Inc.  COMPARATIVE SPILLOVER DYNAMICS OF AVIAN INFLUENZA IN ENDEMIC COUNTRIES  \$2.6m 9/18/2008 8/7/2012  R01Al079231 Ecohealth Alliance Inc.  RISK OF VIRAL EMERGENCE FROM BATS  \$442.8k 9/15/2007 9/14/2011  K08Al067549 Ecohealth Alliance Inc.  RISK FOR FUTURE OUTBREAKS OF HENIPAVIRUSES IN SOUTH ASIA   | UNDERSTANDING     | RISK OF ZOONOTIC VIRUS EN | MERGENCE IN EID HOT      | SPOTS OF SOUTH | HEAST ASIA |
| RO1Al110964 Ecohealth Alliance Inc.  UNDERSTANDING THE RISK OF BAT CORONAVIRUS EMERGENCE  \$300.0k 9/17/2012 9/14/2012  R56TW009502 Ecohealth Alliance Inc.  COMPARATIVE SPILLOVER DYNAMICS OF AVIAN INFLUENZA IN ENDEMIC COUNTRIES  \$2.6m 9/18/2008 8/7/2012  RO1Al079231 Ecohealth Alliance Inc.  RISK OF VIRAL EMERGENCE FROM BATS  \$442.8k 9/15/2007 9/14/2011  K08Al067549 Ecohealth Alliance Inc.  RISK FOR FUTURE OUTBREAKS OF HENIPAVIRUSES IN SOUTH ASIA   | 6                 | 0                         |                          |                |            |
| \$300.0k 9/17/2012 9/14/2012  R56TW009502 Ecohealth Alliance Inc.  COMPARATIVE SPILLOVER DYNAMICS OF AVIAN INFLUENZA IN ENDEMIC COUNTRIES  R01AI079231 Ecohealth Alliance Inc.  RISK OF VIRAL EMERGENCE FROM BATS  K08AI067549 Ecohealth Alliance Inc.  RISK FOR FUTURE OUTBREAKS OF HENIPAVIRUSES IN SOUTH ASIA  | R01AI110964       | Ecohealth Alliance Inc.   | \$3.7m                   | 6/1/2014       | 9/14/2021  |
| RESETWO09502 Ecohealth Alliance Inc.  COMPARATIVE SPILLOVER DYNAMICS OF AVIAN INFLUENZA IN ENDEMIC COUNTRIES  **RO1AI079231**  Ecohealth Alliance Inc.  RISK OF VIRAL EMERGENCE FROM BATS  **S442.8k**  **S442.8k**  **9/15/2007**  9/14/2011*  **K08AI067549**  Ecohealth Alliance Inc.  RISK FOR FUTURE OUTBREAKS OF HENIPAVIRUSES IN SOUTH ASIA  **\$3.7m**  8/1/2002**  7/27/201.   | UNDERSTANDING     | THE RISK OF BAT CORONAVIR | RUS EMERGENCE            |                |            |
| RESETWO09502 Ecohealth Alliance Inc.  COMPARATIVE SPILLOVER DYNAMICS OF AVIAN INFLUENZA IN ENDEMIC COUNTRIES  **RO1AI079231**  Ecohealth Alliance Inc.  RISK OF VIRAL EMERGENCE FROM BATS  **S442.8k**  **S442.8k**  **9/15/2007**  9/14/2011*  **K08AI067549**  Ecohealth Alliance Inc.  RISK FOR FUTURE OUTBREAKS OF HENIPAVIRUSES IN SOUTH ASIA  **\$3.7m**  8/1/2002**  7/27/201.   |                   | <b>②</b>                  |                          |                |            |
| \$2.6m 9/18/2008 8/7/2012  R01AI079231 Ecohealth Alliance Inc.  RISK OF VIRAL EMERGENCE FROM BATS   \$442.8k 9/15/2007 9/14/2014  K08AI067549 Ecohealth Alliance Inc.  RISK FOR FUTURE OUTBREAKS OF HENIPAVIRUSES IN SOUTH ASIA  \$3.7m 8/1/2002 7/27/201.  | R56TW009502       | Ecohealth Alliance Inc.   | \$300.0k                 | 9/17/2012      | 9/14/2012  |
| RO1AI079231 Ecohealth Alliance Inc.  RISK OF VIRAL EMERGENCE FROM BATS  \$442.8k 9/15/2007 9/14/2019  K08AI067549 Ecohealth Alliance Inc.  RISK FOR FUTURE OUTBREAKS OF HENIPAVIRUSES IN SOUTH ASIA  \$3.7m 8/1/2002 7/27/2019  | COMPARATIVE SPI   | LLOVER DYNAMICS OF AVIAN  | I INFLUENZA IN ENDE      | MIC COUNTRIES  |            |
| RO1AI079231 Ecohealth Alliance Inc.  RISK OF VIRAL EMERGENCE FROM BATS  \$442.8k 9/15/2007 9/14/2019  K08AI067549 Ecohealth Alliance Inc.  RISK FOR FUTURE OUTBREAKS OF HENIPAVIRUSES IN SOUTH ASIA  \$3.7m 8/1/2002 7/27/2019  | 8                 | 0                         |                          |                |            |
| \$442.8k 9/15/2007 9/14/2019  K08AI067549 Ecohealth Alliance Inc.  RISK FOR FUTURE OUTBREAKS OF HENIPAVIRUSES IN SOUTH ASIA  \$3.7m 8/1/2002 7/27/201.  | R01AI079231       | Ecohealth Alliance Inc.   | \$2.6m                   | 9/18/2008      | 8/7/2012   |
| KOBAI067549 Ecohealth Alliance Inc.  RISK FOR FUTURE OUTBREAKS OF HENIPAVIRUSES IN SOUTH ASIA  \$3.7m 8/1/2002 7/27/201.  | RISK OF VIRAL EMI | ERGENCE FROM BATS         |                          |                |            |
| KOBAI067549 Ecohealth Alliance Inc.  RISK FOR FUTURE OUTBREAKS OF HENIPAVIRUSES IN SOUTH ASIA  \$3.7m 8/1/2002 7/27/201.  |                   |                           |                          |                |            |
| \$3.7m 8/1/2002 7/27/201.   | K08AI067549       | Ecohealth Alliance Inc.   | \$442.8k                 | 9/15/2007      | 9/14/2010  |
|   | RISK FOR FUTURE   | OUTBREAKS OF HENIPAVIRUS  | ES IN SOUTH ASIA         |                |            |
|   | A PAGE            | 0                         |                          |                |            |
|   | R01TW005869       | Ecohealth Alliance Inc.   | \$3.7m                   | 8/1/2002       | 7/27/2012  |

THE ECOLOGY, EMERGENCE AND PANDEMIC POTENTIAL OF NIPAH VIRUS IN BANGLADESH

## Pentagon grants:

|  | Federal | Grant Awards fo | r Ecohealth Alliance Inc. |
|--|---------|-----------------|---------------------------|
|--|---------|-----------------|---------------------------|

| Name                           | Awardee  | Dollars<br>Obligated | Award Date       | Updated At      |
|--------------------------------|--|----------------------|------------------|-----------------|
| <b>(S)</b>                     | 0  |                      |                  |                 |
| HDTRA12110023                  | Ecohealth Alliance Inc.                            | \$253.3k             | 7/20/2021        | 7/19/2021       |
| PREDICTING BIOT                | HREAT IMPACTS FROM EAF                             | RLY-STAGE DAT        | A VIA TRANSFER   | LEARNING.       |
| <b>9</b>                       | 0  |                      |                  |                 |
| HDTRA12010029                  | Ecohealth Alliance Inc.                            | \$3.0m               | 9/29/2020        | 9/29/2020       |
|                                | hreat of middle east res<br>A in Jordan & strength |                      |                  |                 |
| <b>9</b>                       | 0  |                      |                  |                 |
| HDTRA12010026                  | Ecohealth Alliance Inc.                            | \$3.0m               | 9/25/2020        | 9/24/2020       |
| BIOSURVEILLANCE                | E FOR SPILLOVER OF HENIP<br>INDIA.                 | AVIRUSES AND         | FILOVIRUSES IN   | RURAL           |
| ₩                              | 0  |                      |                  |                 |
| HDTRA12010018                  | Ecohealth Alliance Inc.                            | \$5.0m               | 7/1/2020         | 6/30/2020       |
| CRIMEAN-CONGC<br>TANZANIA.     | ) HEMORRHAGIC FEVER: RE                            | ducing an en         | MERGING HEALTH   | THREAT IN       |
| <b>9</b>                       | 0  |                      |                  |                 |
| HDTRA12010016                  | Ecohealth Alliance Inc.                            | \$4.9m               | 6/1/2020         | 5/27/2020       |
| REDUCING THE TH                | HREAT FROM HIGH-RISK PA                            | THOGENS CAU          | SING FEBRILE ILL | NESS IN LIBER   |
| <b>₩</b>                       | 0  | \$5.0m               | 8/19/2019        | 3/24/2020       |
| HDTRA11910033                  | Ecohealth Alliance Inc.                            |                      |                  |                 |
| REDUCING THE THE SOCIO-ECONOMI | HREAT OF RIFT VALLEY FEVE                          | er through e         | COLOGY, EPIDEM   | IOLOGY AND      |
| <b>39</b>                      | 0  | \$6.5m               | 10/2/2017        | 3/23/2020       |
| HDTRA11710064                  | Ecohealth Alliance Inc.                            |                      |                  |                 |
|                                | THE RISK OF BAT-BORNE 2                            | ZOONOTIC DISI        | EASE EMERGENCI   | E IN WESTERN    |
| M .                            | 0  |                      |                  |                 |
| HDTRA11710037                  | Ecohealth Alliance Inc.                            | \$1.6m               | 5/1/2017         | 5/25/2018       |
|                                | SURVEILLANCE FOR SPILLO                            | VER OF HENID         | AVIRUSES AND E   | II OVIRLISES AT |
|                                | ND HUNTING HUMANANIN                               |                      |                  |                 |
|                                | 0  |                      |                  |                 |

UNDERSTANDING RIFT VALLEY FEVER IN THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

\$4.9m 5/28/2014 5/25/2018

Source: govtribe.com

Coronavirus research in controversial Pentagon biolab in Georgia

HDTRA11410029 Ecohealth Alliance Inc.

EcoHealth Alliance has implemented a number of military biological research programs for the Pentagon. In 2017 the US Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) tasked EcoHealth Alliance with a \$6.5 million project to collect and isolate coronaviruses in 5,000 bats in Western Asia. The duration of the program is 5 years (2017-2022) with the Lugar Center, the Pentagon biolaboratory in the Republic of Georgia, being the local laboratory for this genetic research.

The project's objectives are: 1. Capture and non-lethally sample 5,000 bats; 2. Collect 20,000 samples (i.e. oral, rectal swabs and/or feces, and blood) and screen for CoVs using consensus PCR at regional labs in Georgia and Jordan. According to the project presentation, Eco Health Alliance already sampled 270 bats of 9 species in three Western Asian countries: 90 individual bats in Turkey (Aug 2018), Georgia (Sept 2018), and Jordan (Oct 2018).



EcoHealth Alliance and Georgian scientists processing bats for a \$6.5 million Pentagon project in Western Asia (photo: Facebook, Kendra Phelps, Eco Health Alliance, October 2018)

The Lugar Center which is the partner laboratory for this research is a \$180 million Pentagon biolaboratory in Georgia's capital Tbilisi. It has been operated by a special US Army Unit – USAMRU-G, whose personnel have been given diplomatic immunity to research viruses without being diplomats.



The Lugar Center is the \$180 million Pentagon-funded biolaboratory in Georgia's capital Tbilisi



A diplomatic car with a registration plate of the US Embassy to Tbilisi in the car park of the Lugar Center. US scientists working at the Pentagon laboratory in Georgia drive diplomatic vehicles as they have been given diplomatic immunity. Photos: Dilyana Gaytandzhieva

The Lugar Center has become notorious in the last years for controversial activities, laboratory incidents and scandals surrounding the US drug giant Gilead's Hepatitis C program in Georgia which has resulted in at least 248 deaths of patients. The cause of death in the majority of cases has been listed as unknown, internal documents have shown.

There is no public information about the results of the research performed by EcoHealth Alliance at the Lugar Center for the Pentagon neither what viruses have been discovered and what genome experiments have been performed.

## \$5,000 for bat on the black market

The State Security Committee of South Ossetia raised awareness about the EcoHealth Alliance bat research project in neighboring Georgia after a Georgian national Khvicha Mgebrishvili was detained on 3 July 2020 near the village of Adzisar in the Tskhinvali region of South Ossetia for violating the state border. During the interrogation by South Ossetian KGB border officers, he explained that he

was interested in a colony of bats in the villages of Artseu and Grom in the Tskhinvali region. According to Mgebrishvili, he intended to capture the so-called "Bat cocoons" and sell them in Georgia for \$5,000 each. These species are listed in the Red Book and hunting them is punishable by prison in South Ossetia.

Local authorities accused neighboring Georgia of suspicious activities stating that "the Lugar Center for Public Health Research has shown increased interest in the population of South Ossetian bats since 2012". As always the Lugar Center and the US Embassy in Tbilisi denied all allegations as fake news and a conspiracy theory.

In response to all scandals surrounding the Lugar Center and the growing distrust among Georgians the US Embassy in Tbilisi has launched a propaganda campaign to educate the local population with animated movies on social media and Georgian TV channels. All information concerning the Lugar Center apart from the official government narrative has been branded as "fake news", "disinformation" and "conspiracy theories". The Lugar Center has been given by Western media as an example in the fight against the novel coronavirus even though COVID-ravaged Georgia ranks seventh in the world among the countries with the highest number of deaths per million as of this month.

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### Dilyana Gaytandzhieva

http://armswatch.com/

Dilyana Gaytandzhieva is a Bulgarian investigative journalist, Middle East correspondent and founder of Arms Watch. Over the last years she has published a series of revealing reports on weapons supplies to terrorists in Syria, Iraq and Yemen. Her current work is focused on documenting war crimes and illicit arms exports to war zones around the world.